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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________                     
 
No. 09-3797 
_____________                       
 
MAUREEN A. COPPOLA, 
                           Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JNESO-POCONO MEDICAL CENTER, 
DISTRICT COUNCIL 1, IUOE-AFL-CIO;  
POCONO HEALTH SYSTEM; 
POCONO MEDICAL CENTER 
_____________                        
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-08-cv-00798) 
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
_____________                        
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 4, 2010 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, RENDELL and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: November 5, 2010) 
_____________                         
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _____________                        
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
Maureen Coppola was a union employee covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement between the union and her former employer, Pocono Medical Center.  The 
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District Court held that Pennsylvania law, as articulated by the Superior Court, precludes 
Coppola from maintaining a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy 
against Pocono Medical Center.  The sole issue on appeal is whether we predict the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would hold, contrary to the Superior Court‟s longstanding 
precedent, that union employees covered by collective bargaining agreements may sue 
their former employers for wrongful discharge.  Because we are unable to make such a 
prediction, we will affirm.
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I. 
Maureen Coppola was terminated from her job as a nurse at Pocono Medical 
Center for failing to follow a doctor‟s orders to intubate a patient.  As a member of 
JNESO, a professional health care union, Coppola was subject to a collective bargaining 
agreement that provided that the hospital could only discharge union members for “just 
cause.”  The union investigated Coppola‟s termination, determined that it was justified, 
and declined to pursue a grievance on her behalf.   
Coppola then sued Pocono Medical Center and the union.  As relevant here, she 
alleged that she was wrongfully terminated in violation of public policy, as embodied in 
the Pennsylvania Administrative Code‟s standards of nursing conduct.  See 49 Pa. Code 
§ 21.18.  The District Court granted summary judgment to Pocono Medical Center on the 
wrongful discharge claim, holding Coppola was not entitled to maintain her claim as a 
                                                 
 
1
  The District Court had jurisdiction over Coppola‟s original complaint based on the 
Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185.  After Coppola‟s LMRA claims were 
dismissed by stipulation of the parties, the District Court exercised supplemental 
jurisdiction over Coppola‟s remaining state-law wrongful discharge claim.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367.  Our jurisdiction over her appeal arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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matter of Pennsylvania law.  Coppola v. JNESO-Pocono Medical Center, No. 08-0789, 
2009 WL 2707573, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2009).  Relying in particular on Phillips v. 
Babcock & Wilcox, 503 A.2d 36 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), the Court observed that that 
“Pennsylvania appellate courts have been clear” that union employees covered by a 
collective bargaining agreement may not pursue such claims.  Id. at *2-3. 
II. 
On appeal, Coppola does not quarrel with the District Court‟s application of the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court‟s Phillips decision.  Instead, she asks us to predict that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would abrogate Phillips and hold that union employees 
subject to collective bargaining agreements may pursue wrongful discharge claims.   
Our review of the District Court‟s application of state law is plenary.  Polselli v. 
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 524, 528 n.3 (3d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).  
“In the absence of any precedent of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, we must predict 
how that court would decide this issue.”  Id. (citation omitted).  At the same time, 
however, we must accord significant weight to decisions of the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court.  The decision of an “„intermediate appellate state court . . . is datum for 
ascertaining state law which is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is 
convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide 
otherwise.‟”  Rolick v. Collins Pine Co., 925 F.2d 661, 664 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting West 
v. AT&T Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940)). 
Applying this standard, we are constrained to hold that Phillips accurately reflects 
Pennsylvania law.  For one thing, Phillips is grounded in the relevant Pennsylvania 
4 
 
Supreme Court precedent.  The Superior Court in Phillips relied heavily on the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court‟s decision in Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 
1974), which established at-will employees‟ rights to sue former employers for wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy.  Phillips explained that the Supreme Court‟s 
purpose in Geary was “to provide a remedy for employees with no other recourse against 
wrongful discharge.”  503 A.2d at 37.  Because union employees enjoy contractual 
protection against discharge without “proper cause” as part of their collective bargaining 
agreements, the Superior Court reasoned, the Supreme Court‟s justification for allowing 
at-will employees to sue former employers for wrongful discharge does not extend to 
union employees.  Id. at 37-38.   
Phillips‟s holding that union employees subject to collective bargaining 
agreements may not pursue wrongful discharge claims against former employers also is 
well established in Pennsylvania law:  numerous state and federal courts applying 
Pennsylvania law have cited Phillips to dismiss wrongful discharge claims brought by 
union employees.  See, e.g., Pekar v. U.S. Steel/Edgar Thomson Works, No. 09-844, 2010 
WL 419421, at *9-10 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2010); Lohman v. Duryea Borough, No. 05-
1423, 2007 WL 4260943, at *14-15 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 2007); Ferrell v. Harvard Indus., 
No. 00-2707, 2001 WL 1301461, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2001); Harper v. Am. Red 
Cross Blood Servs., 153 F. Supp. 2d 719, 721 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Durette v. UGI Corp., 674 
F. Supp. 1139, 1143 (M.D. Pa. 1987); Cairns v. SEPTA, 538 A.2d 659, 660-61 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1988); Ross v. Montour R.R. Co., 516 A.2d 29, 32-33 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). 
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Coppola has not presented any persuasive data that undermines the above or 
otherwise establishes that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would reach a different result.  
Coppola does not challenge the Phillips court‟s reasoning or cite any Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court case that suggests that the Court would be inclined to expand wrongful 
discharge claims to cover union employees.  Instead, she relies on cases from other state 
courts and the U.S. Supreme Court to argue that (1) union employees‟ rights to vindicate 
public policy are “inalienable” and independent of their rights to sue under their 
collective bargaining agreements; (2) federal law precludes states from denying union 
employees tort remedies that it allows to non-union employees; and (3) the distinction 
between at-will and union employees for wrongful discharge claims violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Constitution.  All of these arguments are unavailing. 
First, the notion that union employees‟ public policy rights are “inalienable” and 
must be protected through wrongful discharge claims comes from other states that 
authorize private wrongful discharge lawsuits as a means of enforcing public policy.  See, 
e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Super. Ct., 876 P.2d 487, 497 (Cal. 1994) (“An 
employee who states a wrongful discharge claim for violation of public policy is 
provided a remedy in tort not only to compensate the individual plaintiff for the loss of 
employment but as an indirect means of vindicating fundamental public policy itself.”).  
But wrongful discharge suits do not perform that function in Pennsylvania.  As Phillips 
explained, in Pennsylvania, “the wrongful discharge cause of action was never intended 
to provide a forum to vindicate public policy and punish those who deviate from it.”  503 
A.2d at 37. 
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Second, federal law allows states to extend wrongful discharge claims to union 
employees, but does not require them to do so.  The United States Supreme Court cases 
in this area have held only that federal labor laws do not pre-empt “independent 
remedies,” including wrongful discharge claims, available to union members “under state 
law.”  Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 261 (1994); see also Lingle v. 
Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988).  As the District Court correctly pointed out, those 
cases do not speak to union members‟ ability to pursue such claims in states, like 
Pennsylvania, where no state-law remedy exists.  Coppola, 2009 WL 2707573, at *4.
2
 
Coppola‟s third and final argument, concerning the Equal Protection Clause, was 
not raised in the parties‟ summary judgment briefs or addressed by the District Court.  
The issue also is not well developed in the briefs on appeal.  Thus, consistent with our 
practice, we decline to “address the merits of a constitutional argument for the first time 
on appeal.”  C.H. v. Cape Henlopen Sch. Dist., 606 F.3d 59, 73 (3d Cir. 2010). 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
                                                 
 
2
  The other line of United States Supreme Court cases on which Coppola relies, 
beginning with Lodge 76, International Ass’n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment 
Relations Commission, 427 U.S. 132 (1976), does not apply here.  Those cases hold that 
federal labor laws prohibit states from regulating “the free play of economic forces,” and 
specifically forbid states from “imposing additional restrictions on economic weapons of 
self-help, such as strikes or lockouts.”  Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 
475 U.S. 608, 614-15 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  This case 
does not concern any restraint that has been imposed on unions‟ or employers‟ bargaining 
practices.  Moreover, as a practical matter, Coppola fails to explain how we would apply 
Machinists pre-emption, which typically invalidates state regulations, to create a new 
Pennsylvania common-law remedy for union employees.   
